Consider a setting in which ÿrms randomly discover new ideas that a ect their products or services and implement favorable ones. At the same time that ÿrms are adapting their o erings, consumers are searching among ÿrms for the best match. It is shown that implicit in these dual dynamics is an increasing returns mechanism which can result in one ÿrm dominating the market in the long run. The conditions under which there is sustained market dominance are characterized. ? 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Consider the following scenarios:
• Stores in a geographic market compete through their practices. Upon discovery of a new practice, a store manager evaluates the proÿtability of its adoption and decides whether or not to implement it. At the same time that stores' practices are evolving, consumers are searching among stores to ÿnd the one whose practices best conform to their preferences.
• Firms compete by modifying their products. Brand managers discover new product attributes which they adopt and sell in test markets. Those modiÿcations that seem to work are retained and rolled out for the general market. At the same time, consumers are trying di erent products to ÿnd the best match.
• Internet sites compete by upgrading their site. Through online surveys and the tracking of clickstream behavior of those who visit their site, an online company learns about the preferences of visitors. Based on the information they have collected, a site evaluates new ideas and implements those that seem to meet the needs of their visitors. Simultaneously, consumers are surÿng among sites to ÿnd the one they like best.
What are the implications of these dual dynamics -ÿrms adapting their o erings and consumers sorting themselves among ÿrms -for market dominance? If one ÿrm initially has a better store or product or Internet site and thereby attracts a bigger share of the market, does it have a higher likelihood of being dominant in the future? If market dominance is achieved, how easily is it sustained? How does the rate of consumer experimentation a ect the persistence of market dominance?
In addressing these questions, this paper makes two contributions. First, it identiÿes a new source of increasing returns predicated on the property that a ÿrm's current customer base in uences what innovations it adopts. The right customer mix leads a ÿrm to adopt the right kind of ideas which induces consumer sorting that generates an even better customer mix leading the ÿrm to adopt even better ideas. While this feedback system is based upon a ÿrm's customer mix, as opposed to market share as in most other increasing returns mechanisms, this will ultimately lead to dominance as measured by market share. The second contribution is exploring when this increasing returns mechanism generates sustained market dominance -one ÿrm persistently having a higher market share. Analysis is performed on two models. In the ÿrst model, ÿrms' o erings are di erentiated horizontally and innovation takes the form of a new set of attributes in this space. We show that, regardless of the rate of consumer experimentation, sustained market dominance can occur and is a more robust phenomenon than a symmetric market outcome. The model is then adapted to also allow the quality of ÿrms' o erings to di er and be stochastic. If the maximum quality di erential is su ciently low, the possibility of sustained market dominance persists. If it is suciently high then sustained market dominance does not occur so that the identity of the market leader never gets locked in.
The increasing returns mechanism described in this paper is quite distinct from previously identiÿed mechanisms. Learning-by-doing creates increasing returns because higher cumulative production results in lower marginal cost which induces the ÿrm to price lower and produce more and this higher output further increases its cost advantage (see, for example, Cabral and Riordan, 1994) . Another well-known source of increasing returns is associated with network externalities which a product possesses when its value to a consumer is increasing in how many other consumers use it. A ÿrm that initially has a high share of users then has a more appealing product. This causes new consumers to adopt it at a higher rate which results in an even higher share of users in the future (see, for example, Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1986) . A third source of increasing returns is identiÿed by Bagwell et al. (1997) . Motivated by retail chains, they consider a setting in which a ÿrm with higher sales has a greater incentive to invest in reducing marginal cost which leads it to set a lower price, thereby generating yet higher sales and a yet greater incentive to engage in cost-reducing investment.
Model
There are two ÿrms: ÿrms 1 and 2. At any point in time, a ÿrm has a location that represents the attributes of its product or service. Let x t−1 i denote the attributes of ÿrm i at the start of period t. x t−1 i is restricted to lie in X which is a ÿnite subset of [0, 1] . However, for purposes of the ensuing analysis, many of the functions in this section that depend on a ÿrm's attributes will be deÿned ∀x t−1 i ∈ [0; 1].
1 Time is discrete and unbounded so that t =1; 2; : : : There is a continuum of consumers who have preferences over attributes with each consumer being deÿned by an ideal set of attributes. For simplicity, there are only two types of consumers. A type 0 consumer's ideal location is 0 and a type 1 consumer's ideal location is 1. A fraction ∈ (0:5; 1) of consumers are type 0. The type 0 consumer should be thought of as the typical consumer in this market and type 1 consumers as representing more of a niche sub-market.
At any point in time, a consumer is loyal to one of the ÿrms which means buying from it with probability 1− and buying from the other ÿrm with probability ∈ (0; 1 2 ). One can think of as the rate of consumer search but also as being driven by exogenous forces disturbing a consumer's routine; for example, a consumer might happen to be near his less favored store or clicks a link to an Internet site while surÿng.
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The proÿt to a ÿrm with attributes x generated by a type k customer is speciÿed to be g(|k − x|) which is assumed to be a decreasing strictly concave function of |k − x|: 1− ] → R + denote the proÿt to a ÿrm when its location in attribute space is x and it has a mass w(0) of loyal type 0 customers and a mass w(1) of loyal type 1 customers:
1 Specifying X to be ÿnite will allow us to use results from the theory of ÿnite Markov chains. Results have also been derived when locations lie in [0, 1] and are qualitatively similar though with more complicated proofs; see Harrington and Chang (2001) .
2 Results are robust to allowing to vary over time, either deterministically or stochastically. What is important is that is bounded above zero and below 1 2 . 3 The astute reader will notice that a ÿrm's current proÿt depends only on its current attributes and not on its rival's. While a rival's past attributes will in uence whether a consumer comes to a ÿrm -thus determining (w(0); w(1)) -once those consumers are there, it is the ÿrm's attribute that determines how much proÿt the ÿrm earns from those consumers.
A ÿrm with w(0) loyal type 0 customers ÿnds a fraction 1 − of them buying from it and a fraction of the − w(0) type 0 consumers who are loyal to the other ÿrm. The total mass of type 0 consumers buying is then [(1 − )w(0) + ( − w(0))] and from each of them the ÿrm earns proÿt of g(x). Similarly, one can explain the proÿt generated by type 1 consumers.
Firm i enters period t with attributes x t−1 i
. The discovery of alternative attributes is presumed to be an act of creativity. Contrary to the usual assumption that the attribute space is known, we assume that it is unknown and innovation involves identifying points in that space. More speciÿcally, in each period, a ÿrm comes up with a new set of attributes with probability ! ∈ (0; 1). 4 The idea for period t is denoted y t i and is drawn according to a probability distribution with full support on X .
Given a new idea, ÿrm i decides either to discard it, in which case x t i =x t−1 i so that it maintains its current attributes, or to adopt it, in which case x t i = y t i .
5 A crucial feature to our model is how we specify the manner in which this decision is made. The ÿrm is faced with a complex dynamic problem in that it will be receiving many ideas over time from an unknown space while operating in a perpetually changing environment as its competitor alters the character of its product and consumers switch loyalties. While a ÿrm's behavior may be well approximated by an equilibrium strategy, such is not obvious. Rather than pursue that route, we have chosen an alternative approach by assuming that ÿrms deploy heuristics -decision rules that, in a simple manner, condition on only part of an agent's information set. It is well documented that agents deploy heuristics when faced with complex environments.
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In guiding the speciÿcation of a ÿrm's heuristic, we draw on our reading of the literature which suggests that retailers in consumer markets think about strategy in terms of satisfying some targeted group of consumers. 7 In each period, a ÿrm is assumed to have a target customer base. A new idea is adopted if it satisÿes that base in the sense of generating more proÿt from it. Otherwise, the idea is discarded. Rather than specify a speciÿc rule of that form, we consider a wide class of such rules that is deÿned by the target customer base depending on the actual loyal customer base but not on ÿrms' current attributes and, in this manner, uses limited information about the environment. A ÿrm with loyal customer base (w(0); w(1)) is deÿned to have a target customer base comprised of the type 0 consumers with mass Â 0 (w(0); w(1)) and type 1 consumers with mass Â 1 (w(0); w(1)). Two restrictions are placed on this class of heuristics. By A4, the target customer base is always strictly positive so that no consumer type is ignored. This seems compelling since ¿ 0 implies that a ÿrm will always have both consumer types buying from it. A5 requires that more loyal consumers of, say, type 0 raises the target base for type 0 consumers and (weakly) 4 Assuming ! ¡ 1 simpliÿes some steps in the proofs. All results go through if ! = 1. 5 Though ÿrms are not permitted to recall previously discovered ideas, if memory is bounded, so a ÿrm could only retain some maximal number of ideas, our results should still be true. 6 There is a very large literature here that would take us too far aÿeld to seriously cover. A useful point of departure for interested readers is Gigerenzer et al. (1999) .
7 "The retailer should have a fully developed marketing strategy, which should include the speciÿc target market. A target market is the group or groups of customers that the retailer is seeking to serve." (Dunne and Lusch, 1999, p. 50) . Also, see Kotler (1997, Chapter 2). lowers the target base for type 1 consumers. Thus, a ÿrm's target set of consumers is responsive to its current customer base in an intuitively reasonable manner:
(A5) @Â i =@w(i) ¿ 0 and @Â i =@w(j) 6 0 (j = i), i; j ∈ {0; 1}.
A ÿrm's adoption decision regarding a new idea is based on virtual proÿt which is deÿned to be the proÿt based on the target customer base:
In Lemma 1, (w(0); w(1)) is deÿned to be the location that maximizes virtual proÿt when the choice set for x is [0,1]. It shows that the optimal ÿrm location is well deÿned and is decreasing in the mass of type 0 loyal customers and increasing in the mass of type 1 loyal customers. Proofs are in Appendix B.
is unique, @ =@w(0) ¡ 0, and @ =@w(1) ¿ 0.
Deÿne ≡ ( ; 0) and ≡ (0; 1 − ) as the optimal location from [0,1] when a ÿrm's loyal customers are all of the type 0 consumers and all of the type 1 consumers, respectively. By Lemma 1, it follows that (w(0); w(1)) ∈ [ ; ] ∀ (w(0); w(1)). To save on notation, let ÿ t and t denote the mass of type 0 consumers and type 1 consumers, respectively, that are loyal to ÿrm 1 in period t. Firm 1's virtual proÿt in period t can then be represented as˜ 1 
Recall that a ÿrm's attributes is restricted to being in X where X is a ÿnite subset of [0, 1] . For convenience, it is assumed that ; ;ˆ ; 0; 1 ∈ X whereˆ ≡ ( =2; (1 − )=2) is the optimal location when ÿrms equally share the market. Generally, we want to think of X as being fairly dense with the ÿniteness introduced to avoid the complications associated with an uncountable state space.
Given a target customer base, a new idea, y t i , is adopted if and only if it raises virtual proÿt. The dynamic on ÿrm practices is then 
This class of heuristics encompasses many natural rules. One such rule is myopic hillclimbing -adopt an idea if it raises current proÿt -which is the case when the target base is the current customer base:
Although myopic, this heuristic is a plausible response to the dynamic problem at hand; founded on the idea that a ÿrm should work to retain those consumers who are already loyal rather than pursue the riskier strategy of alienating them in order to attract other consumer types. Indeed, there is considerable emphasis in the business strategy literature on customer retention. 8 Furthermore, case studies document ÿrms focusing their resources on developing innovations that serve existing customers. For several industries including the hard disk drive and mechanical excavator industries, Christensen (1997) argues that the reticence of leading ÿrms to adopt drastic new technologies was due to them having "well-developed systems for killing ideas that their customers do not want" (p. xix). It was further argued that successful ÿrms had learned to listen and respond to the needs of their existing customers and avoid projects that would not serve them but rather some other customer base.
9 It is also easy to see how this heuristic could be executed. A manager could implement a new idea for a period of experimentation which serves to reveal its proÿtability. What is implicitly assumed is that the length of the period of experimentation is very small so that ÿrms engage in virtual experimentation (Gale and Rosenthal, 1999) . One might further argue that those consumers who buy or visit a ÿrm may be the best source of information about what are worthwhile ideas which would make (4) quite plausible.
Alternatively, a ÿrm may seek to modify its practices so that they serve the broader market population. This can be encompassed by having the target customer base be a weighted average of their loyal (or current) customer base and the market population. The appeal of this heuristic is that it balances the short-run need to earn proÿt from the existing customer base with the long-term goal of attracting a broader market segment. Implementation might be achieved by using exit surveys of existing consumers along with the creation of focus groups based on demographic information on the local population.
Given this heuristic for judging ideas, it is straightforward to characterize the set of acceptable ideas. Let us initially do this when the set of ideas is [0, 1] . With current location x and loyal customers (w(0); w(1)), it follows from the strict concavity of that there is a connected set of locations that yields at least as high a level of virtual proÿt as is achieved with x. One extreme point of this set is x. The other extreme point, denoted (x; w(0); w(1)), is deÿned by˜ ( (x; w(0); w(1)); w(0); w(1))= (x; w(0); w(1)) (see Fig. 1 ). 10 Deÿne 1 (x; ÿ; ) ≡ (x; ÿ; ) and 2 (x; ÿ; ) ≡ (x; − ÿ; 1 − − ). The set of acceptable ideas in period t is
8 Reichheld and Sasser (1990) argue that the customer defection rate has a major impact on proÿt and that a ÿrm should strive to have zero defections. An Arthur Andersen study found that it cost 5 -15 times as much as to attract new consumers and that a 5% increase in customer retention can increase proÿts by 25 -40% (Chain Store Age, November 1995, p. 88). Whether or not one ÿnds these estimates meaningful (as sample selection bias is probably a serious problem), it does say something about how ÿrms perceive their environment and thus what types of heuristics they may deploy. 9 Another example is Lowe's decision to go from 20 000 square foot stores to 100 000 square foot stores which was purportedly based on an exit survey of 2400 customers (Forbes, December 18, 1995, pp. 116 -117) . 10 When @x ∈ [0; 1] such that˜ (x ; w(0); w(1)) =˜ (x; w(0); w(1)) then = 0 if ¡ x and = 1 if ¿ x.
Of course, a ÿrm is restricted to ideas in X so that the set of acceptable and feasible ideas is
Next consider the equation of motion on a ÿrm's loyal customers. A consumer who is loyal to ÿrm i in period t and buys from ÿrm i in period t is assumed to remain loyal. A type k consumer who is loyal to ÿrm i in period t and buys from store j in period t remains loyal to ÿrm i if |x − k| = |x t j − k| then 50% of such consumers switch loyalty. The idea is that a consumer's loyalty is based on how close a ÿrm's product is to the consumer's ideal product. If a consumer loyal to ÿrm i bought from it in period t − 1 but experimented with the other ÿrm in period t then the consumer is assumed to make this judgement by comparing their most recent experiences. To ensure that this is the preceding period for a consumer's favored ÿrm, it is assumed that if a consumer experimented in period t and remained loyal then experimentation does not occur in period t + 1. A consumer's information is then no more than one period old. For example, if x t−1 1 ¿ x t 2 then type 0 customers who are loyal to ÿrm 1 and buy from ÿrm 2 switch loyalty to ÿrm 2. Thus, ÿrm 1 only retains 1 − of its ÿ t type 0 consumers who were loyal to it in the previous period. If, in addition, x t 1 ¡ x t−1 2 then type 0 customers who are loyal to ÿrm 2 and buy from ÿrm 1 will switch loyalty to ÿrm 1. There are ( − ÿ t ) such consumers. As a result, when
. The full equations of motion are provided in Appendix A.
These dual dynamics create a feedback system deÿned on the state variables, (x t−1 1 ; x t−1 2 ; ÿ t ; t ). The dynamic on ÿrm practices in (3) depends on the current allocation of loyal customers across ÿrms while the allocation of customer loyalty depends on ÿrms' attributes. This feedback mechanism has the potential for creating market dominance.
For suppose ÿrm 1's share of loyal customers is biased towards type 0 consumers. Then a new idea that generates more proÿt out of type 0 consumers will generate greater virtual proÿt to ÿrm 1. It is then inclined to adopt such an idea and, by the same reasoning, is disinclined to adopt ideas appealing to type 1 consumers. Furthermore, if ÿrm 1's loyal customers are biased to being type 0 then this must mean that ÿrm 2's loyal customers tend to be of type 1. By an analogous logic, ÿrm 2 is inclined to adopt ideas that appeal to type 1 consumers. In this manner, ÿrm 1 will become increasingly attractive (relative to ÿrm 2) to type 0 consumers and thus induce more of them to become loyal to it. This is the potential for increasing returns as an initial stock of loyal consumers biased to being type 0 can induce adoption of ideas by a ÿrm that causes the new stock of loyal consumers to be even more heavily type 0. Given such a feedback mechanism, one would expect there to be events in which one ÿrm is increasingly dominant. The real issue is whether that is necessarily the case and, if it can occur, whether it can lead to one ÿrm permanently dominating the ÿrm or, because ÿrms are continually innovating, must there eventually be a disruption of the current market structure.
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While this particular feedback system between ÿrms and consumers is new, previous work has modelled the dynamic movement of buyers among sellers. In Bergemann and V alim aki (1997), a new ÿrm's product is of unknown quality and both buyers and sellers receives signals; the informativeness of which is increasing in the number of units sold of the product. Buyers move among sellers as they learn about the new seller's quality. In the search model of Burdett and Coles (1997) , consumers know the price distribution in the market but not the price that each ÿrm charges. Consumers enter the market and engage in costly price search (products are homogeneous). In each period, a ÿrm has a stock of regular customers who are deÿned to be those that bought from it last period. They avoid search costs by buying from the ÿrm again. This gives a ÿrm some market power over its regular customers which creates feedback as a ÿrm's stock of regular customers in uences its price which determines next period's stock of regular customers. Weisbuch et al. (2000) explore the extent to which buyers and sellers form long-lasting relationships. In each period, buyers decide which seller to visit using reinforcement learning with the probability of visiting a seller depending on the past proÿt realized by interacting with that seller. Finally, Currie and Metcalfe (2001) consider competing duopolists who use heuristics to choose price, production, and investment, while consumers determine loyalty on the basis of price though subject to some inertia in their switching behavior. One of the main objectives of their analysis is to characterize those situations for which a less e cient ÿrm is driven out of the industry.
Nash equilibrium
Prior to analyzing adaptive dynamics, it is useful to characterize Nash equilibrium for the complete information static game as a benchmark. Imagine that ÿrms know the distribution of consumers, the rate at which consumers buy from them, and the space of attributes. Thus, contrary to the preceding model, ÿrms know all that could be known about how to satisfy consumers. A ÿrm is modelled as choosing attributes to maximize its proÿt given the (correctly) anticipated attributes of the other ÿrm's product and the (correctly) anticipated sorting by consumers. Firm i's payo is then
By locating to the left (right) of its competitor, a ÿrm induces all type 0 (1) consumers to be loyal to it. If it locates exactly at the other ÿrm's location then the two ÿrms equally divide the set of consumers.
As results in this section are deÿned for when X is su ciently dense, denumerate the elements of X so that X = {x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(K)} where
h ∈ {0; 1; 2; : : : ; K − 1}} as the maximal distance between adjacent prices. Theorem 2 shows that, when X is su ciently dense, if the proportion of type 0 consumers is su ciently high then an equilibrium exists. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique and has both ÿrms deploying the ideal practice for type 0 consumers and thereby sharing the market.
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Theorem 2. ∃ ¿ 0 such that if (X ) ∈ (0; ) then ∃ ∈ ( 1 2 ; 1) such that: (i) if ∈ ( 1 2 ; ) then a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist; and (ii) if ∈ [ ; 1] then (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (0; 0) is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
If ÿrms have di erent locations, say x 1 ¡ x 2 , then ÿrm 1 is attracting type 0 consumers and ÿrm 2 is attracting type 1 consumers. Firm 2 can then improve its proÿt by locating just to the left of x 1 and attracting type 0 consumers because there are more of them than type 1 consumers. The only way that cannot happen is if x 1 = 0. However, if is su ciently close to 1 2 then ÿrm 2 prefers to locate at (the optimal location when all of its loyal customers are type 1) and focus on serving type 1 consumers than to locate at 0 and share both consumer types. But if it does that then ÿrm 1 prefers to locate at (the optimal location when all of its loyal customers are type 0). Hence, an equilibrium does not exist when is low. When is su ciently high, both ÿrms are content to locate at 0 and share the market rather than be the exclusive preferred provider for the minority consumer type. 
Sustained market dominance
A state in the system is a pair of locations and an allocation of customers to ÿrms in terms of their loyalty: (x 1 ; x 2 ; ÿ; ). While (x 1 ; x 2 ) lies in the ÿnite space X , (ÿ; ) lies in the continuum, [0; ]×[0; 1− ]. Although the state space is then uncountable, additional structure will allow us to use the theory of ÿnite Markov chains. In particular, note that the only randomness in (ÿ; ) is from randomness in (x 1 ; x 2 ). Furthermore, if the ordering between (x 1 ; x 2 ) does not change then (ÿ; ) evolves deterministically though, for generic initial conditions, only settles down in the limit. 14 We will use the term dominance to refer to one ÿrm having more than half of the market which will often mean having almost all type 0 consumers as loyal customers. Our primary interest is in characterizing long-run states and determining whether they are characterized by dominance. For this purpose, we deÿne an absorbing state to be one that persists over time.
t+1 ) = (x 1 ;x 2 ;ÿ;ˆ ) with probability one.
Theorem 3 shows that there are three absorbing states. Two of these have a dominant ÿrm -one has ÿrm 1 capturing all type 0 consumers and the other has ÿrm 2 capturing them -and the third has ÿrms equally sharing the market.
Theorem 3. The set of absorbing states is {( ; ; ; 0); ( ; ; 0; 1 − ); (ˆ ;ˆ ; =2;
The remainder of the section explores the extent to which dynamics lead the system to these absorbing states. The ÿrst point to note is that given the equations of motion for (ÿ t ; t ), customer allocations will never reach their values at an absorbing state except for the non-generic event that they start at those values. For example, even when (x
. Therefore, at best, we can expect the system to converge to an absorbing state though never actually be in an absorbing state.
As an initial step, we characterize a set of states such that the asymmetric absorbing states are reached in the limit with probability one. As deÿned below, i is the set of states such that ÿrms' sets of acceptable ideas do not intersect and ÿrm i's maximal acceptable idea is less than ÿrm j's minimal acceptable idea. See Fig. 2 
of a state in 1 .
Next deÿne
as the subset of i that includes only feasible locations. Theorem 4 shows that if the state is in i then ÿrm i dominates for sure in that the system converges to the asymmetric absorbing state in which ÿrm i's loyal customer base is comprised of all type 0 consumers. Once in 1 or 2 , the dynamic path on market shares is deterministic with the dominant ÿrm steadily attracting more type 0 consumers and steadily losing type 1 consumers. However, the path on ÿrms' attributes is stochastic and, furthermore, as shown in the proof, each ÿrm's attributes will generally not be monotonic. Also, note that ( ; ; ; 0) ∈ 1 and that any state su ciently close to ( ; ; ; 0) is also in 1 . Thus, if the state is near ( ; ; ; 0) then it converges almost surely to ( ; ; ; 0). An analogous statement applies to ( ; ; 0; 1 − ) and 2 . In this sense, the asymmetric absorbing states are locally stable. 
If (x 0 1 ; x 0 2 ; ÿ 1 ; 1 ) ∈ 2 then, with probability one,
If the state is in 1 then it implies that x t−1 1 ¡ x t−1 2 so that type 0 consumers prefer ÿrm 1's product. If this ordering of ÿrms' attributes persists then, due to continual consumer experimentation, all type 0 consumers will eventually learn that ÿrm 1 better meets their needs and thus become loyal to ÿrm 1. Similarly, type 1 consumers will eventually all be loyal to ÿrm 2. The next issue is what ensures that this ordering of ÿrms' attributes persists. Note that ÿrm 1 does not adopt any idea in period t which exceeds max { 1 (x 2 } is monotonically increasing over time. As ÿrm 1 acquires more type 0 consumers and fewer type 1 consumers as loyal customers, its set of acceptable and feasible ideas shifts to the left and ÿrm 2's set shifts to the right. Thus, if they do not intersect initially then they do not intersect in any future period. 15 As a result, x 1 ¡ x 2 ∀ ¿ t and therefore ÿrm 1 will eventually have all type 0 consumers loyal to it.
While the asymmetric absorbing states are locally stable, to what extent can the system reach them globally? And to what extent is the system drawn to the symmetric absorbing state? The next result is relevant to addressing both questions. Note that Theorem 5 implies that the symmetric state is not locally stable in the sense that when ÿrms' locations are di erent, even if they are close to (ˆ ;ˆ ), the system will converge to an asymmetric absorbing state with positive probability. This result is independent of how dense X is so that (x t−1 1 ; x t−1 2 ) could be arbitrarily close to (ˆ ;ˆ ) and ÿrms still might not return to (ˆ ;ˆ ). The second implication to note is that the asymmetric states can be reached with positive probability from any initial state as long as ÿrms' locations are distinct. If ÿrms' locations are distinct, it is then possible that those locations will persist for a su ciently long time that most type 0 consumers will be loyal to one ÿrm and most type 1 consumers will be loyal to the other ÿrm. From that point, ÿrms will only adopt locations that will reinforce the bias in their customer base. They are then on a path that leads to an asymmetric absorbing state for sure. We conclude that an asymmetric situation is, speaking imprecisely but still meaningfully, a more robust attractor than the symmetric state.
As described earlier, implicit in our model is an increasing returns mechanism. A ÿrm that currently has a customer mix biased toward the prevalent consumer type in the market will tend to identify as valuable those ideas well suited to that type. Their adoption impacts future loyalty switching by consumers and generally leads to a customer mix even more biased toward the prevalent type which makes the ÿrm more inclined to adopt ideas suitable for them. Eventually, this process results in one of the ÿrms capturing and retaining most of the market. What remains to be explained is why it is absorbing. Indeed, with positive probability, a market laggard (one that is catering to type 1 consumers) will come up with an idea that could attract type 0 consumers away from the market leader. Indeed, any location between 0 and that of the market leader's location will su ce. The problem is that the market laggard rejects such an idea because it is concerned with its own customer base. Thus, the absorbing nature of market dominance -and why it can be permanently sustained -is that a ÿrm's future path is necessarily constrained by its desire to please its current customers. This is exactly the type of bias that was highlighted in the analysis of Christensen (1997) . While the result is generated with a highly simpliÿed model, the underlying story seems quite general.
In Harrington and Chang (2001) , the continuum case is examined as ÿrms' locations lie in [0, 1] . Qualitatively similar but stronger results are derived though with more complex proofs. It is shown that, almost surely, the system converges to one of the asymmetric absorbing states. Thus, sustained market dominance always prevail in that case.
Comparison of the adaptive dynamic with Nash equilibrium
In summarizing the results of the previous two sections, a classical equilibrium analysis generates very di erent predictions than our model of ÿrm and consumer adaptation. Nash equilibrium produces a symmetric outcome with ÿrms locating at 0 so as to best satisfy the most prevalent consumer type. By contrast, adaptive dynamics always result in ÿrms locating in the interior and can produce either market dominance -with ÿrms locating at ( ; ) or ( ; ) -or a symmetric outcome with both ÿrms locating atˆ . The objective of this section is to explain the disparity in these results.
A crucial distinction in these two models is whether a ÿrm perceives its customer base as exogenous or endogenous. Implicit in the Nash equilibrium description of behavior is that a ÿrm takes as ÿxed the other ÿrm's location but expects consumers to fully respond by going to the ÿrm with the best location. For example, ( ; ) is not a Nash equilibrium of the game of Section 3 because, by locating to the left of , ÿrm 2 anticipates attracting all type 0 consumers while those consumers would go to ÿrm 1 if ÿrm 2 located at . Such a response by type 0 consumers makes a move to proÿtable for ÿrm 2 which destabilizes ( ; ). The ability to lure customersan e ect originally identiÿed by Hotelling (1929) -induces each ÿrm to move closer than its rival to the ideal location of the more numerous consumer type. Firms are then moving towards the same target and ultimately end up at 0. 16 In contrast, the adaptive dynamic can lead ÿrms to move in opposite directions. Firms having di erent loyal customer bases will generate di erent target customer bases (by assumptions A4 -A5). If ÿrm 1 has more type 0 consumers relative to ÿrm 2 and ÿrm 2 has more type 1 consumers relative to ÿrm 1 then a location closer to 0 is valued more by ÿrm 1 than by ÿrm 2 and a location closer to 1 is valued more by ÿrm 2 than by ÿrm 1. This can result in ÿrms moving in di erent directions -ÿrm 1 towards 0 and ÿrm 2 towards 1 -and result in an asymmetric outcome being an absorbing state. Critical to this argument is that consumers are not fully and instantaneously adjusting their loyalties to ÿrms' locations. With partial adjustment, a ÿrm's current customer base matters and that is what leads ÿrms to attach di erent evaluations to the same idea. In other words, ÿrms are climbing di erent landscapes by virtue of how their current loyal customers in uences that landscape. In contrast, the full and instantaneous consumer adjustment under a classical game-theoretic approach makes a ÿrm's current customers irrelevant so ÿrms are climbing the same landscape which ultimately leads to symmetry in their ÿnal locations and thereby the absence of market dominance. 16 The stability of ÿrms at (0,0) does require that be su ciently close to 1 (see Theorem 2). If is close to 1 2 then the resulting dynamic story is instead similar to the Edgeworth cycle. Firms move closer to 0 but once a ÿrm is close enough, it moves closer to 1. Such a move results in it conceding type 0 consumers to the other ÿrm and locating so as to generate more proÿt from the type 1 consumers that it attracts.
A second approach to explaining these di erent outcomes is to expand the class of adaptive dynamics so that, under some conditions, the Nash equilibrium outcome is an absorbing state. One can then compare the properties of the adaptive dynamics that result in that outcome as opposed to the absorbing states of Theorem 3. Towards that end, modify the original model by assuming that a ÿrm adopts a new location when it generates average proÿt over the next T periods that exceeds the average proÿt (over the next T periods) from its existing location, assuming ÿrms' locations remain ÿxed thereafter and consumers engage in partial adjustment as speciÿed in Section 2. The adaptive dynamic explored in the previous section is the case of T = 1 as a ÿrm is myopic in only considering current proÿt. Thus, when T = 1 the set of absorbing location pairs for this dynamic is {( ; ); ( ; ); (ˆ ;ˆ )}. We will argue next that if T is su ciently large then the Nash equilibrium outcome is an absorbing state of this dynamic.
First note that the average proÿt for a ÿrm at the state (0; 0; =2;
. Now consider, say, ÿrm 1 locating at x ¿ 0 so that type 0 consumers prefer ÿrm 2 and type 1 consumers prefer ÿrm 1. As a result, a fraction of ÿrm 1's loyal type 0 consumers will switch loyalties to ÿrm 2 each period (as that is the fraction that is searching) and a fraction of ÿrm 2's type 1 consumers will switch to ÿrm 1. Starting with (ÿ 0 ; 0 ) = ( =2; (1 − )=2), ÿrm 1's loyal customer base in t periods is
It follows that ÿrm 1's proÿt in t periods is
where recall that a ÿrm's consumers are comprised of 1 − of its loyal customers and of the other ÿrm's loyal customers. Since
This is the exact same proÿt as for the game-theoretic model (see (5)) and, by Theorem 2, we know that when is su ciently high that this proÿt is less than that from locating at 0. We conclude that if ÿrms evaluate ideas based on the long-run average proÿt then the Nash equilibrium is an absorbing state. To summarize, in the face of gradual consumer adjustment, adaptive dynamics can yield asymmetric outcomes and market dominance when ÿrms are myopic while the Nash equilibrium outcome emerges when ÿrms are far-sighted and inÿnitely patient.
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Before moving on, we would like to make two ÿnal remarks in defense of the adaptive dynamic that generates market dominance. First, though these asymmetric absorbing states are not Nash equilibria, they are local Nash equilibria as each ÿrm's location is locally optimal. Recall that is optimal for ÿrm 1 when all type 0 consumers are loyal to it and is optimal to ÿrm 2 when all type 1 consumers are loyal to it. Furthermore, this customer allocation is stable at ( ; ) -as type 0(1) consumers prefer ÿrm 1(2) -and, most critically, in a neighborhood of it. Thus, a ÿrm's beliefs that the customer allocation will not change in response to its location actually proves to be right when the location is nearby. Firms are then locally optimizing and ( ; ) is a local Nash equilibrium. Second, while a Nash equilibrium does not always exist, the adaptive dynamic always has an absorbing state.
Comparative dynamics and simulations
To explore the presence of a ÿrst-mover advantage and its determinants, simulations were conducted. A ÿrst-mover advantage will refer to any advantage emanating from the initial conditions to the system. Assume that a ÿrm's target customer base is their current customer base, as speciÿed in (4): a ÿrm adopts a new idea if and only if it raises current proÿt. The system then has three parameters:
(the proportion of type 0 consumers in the population), (the rate at which consumers experiment), and ! (the rate at which ÿrms discovers new ideas); and four initial conditions: ÿ 1 (the initial proportion of type 0 consumers loyal to ÿrm 1), 1 (the initial proportion of type 1 consumers loyal to ÿrm 1), x 0 1 (the initial location of ÿrm 1), and x 0 2 (the initial location of ÿrm 2). It is further assumed that g(|k − x|) = 1 − (k − x) 2 . The ensuing long-run locations are
Simulations involve a four step procedure. First, values are set for ; ; !; ÿ 1 , and 1 . Second, values for x 0 1 and x 0 2 are randomly selected from X according to a uniform distribution. X is set at the computer's representation of [0; 1]. In that it is then very unlikely for ÿrms to have identical locations, the symmetric absorbing state is reached with very low probability. The purpose of the simulations is instead to explore what factors are conducive to a speciÿc ÿrm dominating. Third, the model is played out which involves generating a sequence of ideas and having ÿrms and consumers respond to that sequence according to the equations of motion. The second and third steps are repeated 1000 times. The values reported are the averages of these 1000 runs.
The height of the surface in Fig. 3 measures the frequency with which ÿrm 1 dominates so that the long-run market share of ÿrm 1 is (1 − ) + (1 − ). Its dependence on ÿrm 1's initial share of type 0 consumers, ÿ 1 = , and its initial share of type 1 consumers, 1 =(1 − ), is shown. These results are for when 60% of consumers are type 0 ( =0:6), on average a ÿrm receives seven ideas every ten periods (!=0:7), and on average a consumer experiments once every ten periods ( = 0:1) and once every ÿve periods ( =0:2). Fig. 3 shows that a higher mass of loyal type 0 consumers and a lower mass of loyal type 1 consumers increases the frequency with which ÿrm 1 dominates. By having an initial customer mix biased towards type 0 consumers, ÿrm 1 is more inclined to adopt ideas suitable for type 0 consumers and this ultimately enhances the likelihood of dominating the market.
A second question to explore with simulations is to what extent the rate of consumer experimentation is complementary to this ÿrst-mover advantage. There are two countervailing forces at play. If, say, ÿrm 1 has a higher mix of type 0 consumers, it is more likely than the other ÿrm to adopt a location that is more attractive to those consumers. If consumers experiment at a higher rate, type 0 consumers who are currently loyal to the other store will then learn about the ÿrm's superior product and ow to it quicker. This makes it more likely that the state will get into 1 . By this argument, a higher value for augments the ÿrst-mover advantage from a higher mix of type 0 consumers. On the other hand, if the current market laggard, in terms of the customer mix, is able to develop a superior product then more consumer experimentation will result in a heavier ow of type 0 consumers to it. It may then be able to become a market leader before the other ÿrm develops a yet even better practice. In other words, a higher rate of consumer experimentation can allow the market leader to more quickly capitalize on its lead but can also allow a market laggard to more quickly supplant the current leader. Examination of Fig. 3 suggests that the latter e ect dominates. As is increased from 0.1 to 0.2, the relationship between initial customer mixes and the frequency with which ÿrm 1 dominates becomes atter; meaning that the likelihood of dominance is less responsive to a ÿrm's customer base. Fig. 4 shows this more generally. The horizontal axis measures the degree of ÿrm 1's ÿrst-mover advantage where it has no advantage at 0.5/0.5 and, from that point upward, its advantage is increasing. As increases, the curve attens which indicates that, for any initial advantage, the frequency with which ÿrm 1 dominates is reduced. From these results, it is concluded that a higher rate of consumer experimentation weakens a ÿrst-mover advantage.
Horizontally and vertically di erentiated practices
While the previous model showed how sustained market dominance can prevail, it had little to say about when we would expect to observe it since such an outcome is always an absorbing state. Towards addressing that question, we now enrich the model to allow ÿrms' products to be both horizontally and vertically di erentiated; that is, the quality of their products can di er.
Let z t i denote the quality of ÿrm i's product in period t and assume it can take on one of a ÿnite number of values from [0; z] where z ¿ 0. A type k consumer prefers a ÿrm with attributes x and quality z to a ÿrm with x and z i |x − k| − |x − k| ¡ z − z . If one ÿrm's product is both closer to a ÿrm's ideal set of attributes and is of higher quality then clearly it is preferred. When, for example, x ¡ x and z ¡ z then a type 0 consumer prefers product (x ; z ) i the gain in the horizontal dimension, x −x , exceeds the loss in the vertical dimension, z − z . Given these preferences, it is straightforward to adapt the equations of motion on customer loyalties. Next assume that quality a ects current (and virtual) proÿt in a proportional manner so that we can retain˜ i (x t i ; ÿ t ; t ) as a ÿrm's virtual proÿt function wlog.
18 Note that one can interpret ÿrms as receiving ideas that a ect the vertical dimension (that is, z t i ) as well as the horizontal dimension (that is, x t i ). Since proÿt is monotonically increasing in quality, it will always adopt quality-improving ideas.
Given our use of distance functions in consumer preferences, what is important for the analysis is not absolute quality but rather relative quality, z t ≡ z t 1 −z t 2 · z t ∈ where is ÿnite a subset of [ − z; z] . A state is now deÿned by
Deÿne : × → [0; 1] to be the probability function over z t . For generality it is allowed to depend on the current state. Two assumptions are made on . A6 requires that positive probability be assigned to ÿrms having identical qualities and to the extreme values. A7 requires that the probability that the quality di erential does not change over a ÿnite number of periods is positive:
18 Suppose proÿt is h(z t i ) i (x t i ; ÿ t ; t ) where h(0) ¿ 0 and h (z t i ) ¿ 0. If we then assume that virtual proÿt is h(z t i )˜ i (x t i ; ÿ t ; t ), the adoption decisions regarding new ideas are una ected by the quality of practices.
To allow for more precise results, one ÿnal assumption is that a ÿrm's optimal location depends only on the ratio of its mass of type 0 consumers to its mass of type 1 consumers. (A8) is homogeneous of degree zero in w(0) and w(1).
A8 holds, for example, when virtual proÿt equals actual proÿt so that ÿrms are engaging in myopic hill-climbing; as speciÿed in (4).
As the quality di erential is continually subject to random uctuations, there does not exist an absorbing state in . However, there will prove to be closed sets of states for which ÿrms' locations do not change. We then deÿne (x 1 ; x 2 ) to be an absorbing pair of locations when there exists an initial customer allocation, (ÿ 1 ; 1 ), such that if (x 0 1 ; x 0 2 ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ) then (x t 1 ; x t 2 ) = (x 1 ; x 2 ) ∀t ¿ 1 for sure. This will require that ÿrms' locations remain ÿxed given the future evolution of customer allocations and irrespective of the quality shocks. Subject to one caveat to be mentioned after the theorem, Theorem 6 establishes that Theorem 3 is robust to allowing for vertical di erentiation as long as the maximum quality di erential is not too large. When ÿrms' qualities are identical, which is an event that can occur with positive probability for any ÿnite length of time (by A7), ÿrms' locations and customer bases evolve exactly as found in Section 4. Hence, the only candidates for absorbing location pairs are those described in Theorem 3. To begin, let us examine an asymmetric substate, ( ; ; ; 0). Consider {( ; 0)} as a candidate for and suppose (x 1 ; x 2 ; ÿ; ) = ( ; ; ; 0). Since the quality di erential is bounded above by the di erence in ÿrms' locations, z ¡ − , type 0 consumers will prefer ÿrm 1's location of and type 1 consumers will prefer ÿrm 2's location of irrespective of their qualities. Thus, once the state is ( ; ; ; 0), ÿrms' locations and customers' loyalties remain ÿxed.
The same type of argument as used in the proof of Theorem 5 can establish that the asymmetric absorbing location pairs can be reached with positive probability when ÿrms' locations are distinct. Although quality shocks do not alter market dominance being an attractor, it would seem that quality shocks can be expected to delay the time until sustained market dominance occurs. For example, suppose 0 ¡ |z t | ¡ x t 2 − x t 1 ¡ − so that ÿrm 1 is attracting type 0 consumers and ÿrm 2 type 1 consumers. The quality di erential is su ciently small that it does not impact consumers' loyalty decisions. In this case, ÿrm 1 is on a path to sustained dominance. What a quality shock can do is to alter the ow of consumers. In particular, if ÿrm 2 experiences a positive shock so that z t+1 ¡ 0 and x t+1 2 − x t+1 1 ¡ |z t+1 | then both consumer types will choose to switch to ÿrm 2. By disrupting the dynamic that is currently making one ÿrm dominant, quality shocks can delay the time it takes until ultimately one ÿrm has achieved a position of sustained dominance.
The presence of quality shocks mildly alters the result for the symmetric state (ˆ ;ˆ ; =2; (1 − )=2). As long as ÿrms' qualities are identical, these locations and customer allocations will persist, by the logic used in proving Theorem 3. But consider what happens when, say, ÿrm 1's product has a quality advantage. Given ÿrms have identical locations, both consumer types will prefer ÿrm 1 and this causes the customer allocation to move from ( =2; (1 − )=2) towards ( ; 1 − ). Thus, = {( =2; (1 − )=2)} will not work to show that (ˆ ;ˆ ) is an absorbing location pair. However, it is shown in the proof of Theorem 6 that if (ÿ t = t ) = ( =(1 − )) then (ÿ t+1 = t+1 ) = ( =(1 − )). Therefore, by A8,ˆ remains each ÿrm's optimal location so that = {(ÿ; ) : (ÿ= ) = ( =(1− ))} will work to show that (ˆ ;ˆ ) is an absorbing pair. Although dominance can switch between the two ÿrms -according to the evolution of the quality di erentialtheir locations remain at (ˆ ;ˆ ). The dominance of a particular ÿrm is then temporary and vanishes when the other ÿrm experiences a favorable quality di erential for su ciently long. Now suppose the maximum quality di erential is not constrained. Not surprisingly, Theorem 7 shows that there is no sustained dominance. Regardless of ÿrms' current locations and customer bases, there will eventually be a su ciently large quality shock that will shift the system to a path leading to the currently non-dominant ÿrm becoming dominant. Note that if x 2 −x 1 ¿ − then it is possible that no quality shock may be su cient to alter the ow of type 0 consumers to ÿrm 1 and type 1 consumers to ÿrm 2 and thereby disrupt the growing dominance of ÿrm 1. However, if this dynamic continues then, with positive probability in ÿnite time, (x 1 ; x 2 ) = ( ; ) at which point if the quality di erential becomes less than −( − ), both consumer types will ow to ÿrm 2. In this manner, dominance can switch from ÿrms 1 to 2 even though quality shocks are bounded below the maximum utility di erence along the horizontal dimension.
To summarize, sustained market dominance can occur -with one ÿrm's market share asymptotically approaching (1 − ) + (1 − ) -when the maximum quality di erential is less than − . When instead the maximum quality di erential exceeds − , the identity of the market leader changes over time; there is no absorbing state with a particular ÿrm being dominant. − is then a critical value that determines whether or not sustained market dominance can emerge. To explore this issue, assume the speciÿcation in (4) so that the target customer base is the current customer base. Using the ÿrst-order conditions deÿning and , it can be derived:
so that − is decreasing in . Therefore, sustained market dominance is less likely when consumers experiment at a higher rate.
To understand this result, one must ÿrst recognize that the crucial issue regarding sustained market dominance is whether ÿrms' locations can be su ciently far apart in the long run so that even if the market laggard has higher quality, it does not alter consumers' loyalty decisions. When ÿrms have comparable qualities and, say, ÿrm 1 is dominant then ÿrms' optimal attributes are stochastically converging to for ÿrm 1 and for ÿrm 2. Therefore, in ÿnite time with positive probability, |x
2 |, then ÿrm 2 cannot induce type 0 customers to become loyal to it even when it has higher-quality practices. This is the basis for Theorem 6. However, if z ¿ − then higher quality induces type 0 customers to become loyal to ÿrm 2 and, in fact, both consumer types are attracted to it. The role of the rate of consumer experimentation, , is as follows. By raising , ÿrms have more similar mixes of consumers buying from them as, in any period, there is a larger fraction of 'noise' consumers; consumers who, in that period, are choosing a ÿrm irrespective of their loyalty. The increased similarity in customer bases causes ÿrms' long-run locations to be more similar. Hence, it becomes more likely that a quality advantage can cause consumers to switch loyalties and turn a market laggard into a market leader. In this manner, a higher rate of consumer experimentation makes sustained market dominance less likely.
Concluding remarks
If, as ÿrms' locations settled down, consumer experimentation went to zero, it would not be surprising if sustained market dominance prevailed. Even if a non-dominant ÿrm adopted a location that would be attractive to the prevalent consumer type, there would be little consumer response to it. If ÿrms restricted themselves to discovering ideas close to their current location, it would also not be surprising if sustained dominance emerged. There might be ideas that would allow a non-dominant ÿrm to become dominant but would never be found. Finally, if ÿrms faced a cost to adjusting their location, it would once again not be surprising that sustained market dominance would emerge. What is striking about our analysis is that -in spite of consumers always engaging in experimentation, ÿrms generating ideas from the entire space, and ÿrms being able to costlessly adjust their locations -sustained market dominance can still prevail. Furthermore, this result is robust to the rate of consumer experimentation though it is not robust to allowing for su ciently great shocks to the quality di erential between ÿrms' products.
In concluding, let us discuss two elements of our approach. First, price-setting behavior is not modelled. If prices are set to maximize static proÿt then allowing ÿrms to choose prices should not upset our results. Since, in the absence of endogenizing prices, ÿrms' attributes tend to diverge, allowing ÿrms to choose price should reinforce that tendency since more similar products result in more intense price competition.
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What would emerge if prices were set with some longer-run objective -for example, a ÿrm charges a low price to lure consumers to try their product or service -is much less clear. Regardless, the model in its current form is relevant to those industries for which non-price competition is the primary avenue of competition. Some services are free to consumers -for example, network television and Internet portals and shopbots -as revenue is collected through advertising. Firms compete for consumers through product characteristics rather than price. In other industries, ÿrms tacitly collude in price which redirects competition to other instruments at ÿrms' disposal. An historically notable example is the U.S. cigarette industry. Industry observers noted that price was relatively ÿxed (at least until generic cigarettes were introduced) and ÿrms competed in product traits, brand variety, and advertising. 20 More generally, in most industries competition occurs on multiple dimensions. If we feel we can learn something about ÿrm behavior and market outcomes by focusing on price while excluding other instruments, there is reason to think that we can learn something by focusing on one of these other variables -product traits for the model at hand -while excluding price.
The other unique element of our model is characterizing ÿrm and consumer behavior through the use of heuristics rather than equilibrium strategies. 21 Equilibrium is an assumption and, like all assumptions, must be judged on how compelling it is for the problem at hand. Is it reasonable for ÿrms to have approximately accurate conjectures of competitors' and consumers' strategies and, given those beliefs, to have identiÿed an approximately optimal solution? The ÿrms in our model certainly have strong incentives to discover what is the best adoption rule concerning new ideas. Those decisions are directly relevant to the ÿrm's proÿt and long-run survival. But the desire of a ÿrm to determine optimal actions must be tempered by the complexity in ÿguring it out. We do believe that the environment of interest is of the level of complexity to warrant the exploration of non-equilibrium approaches. With that in mind, we have considered a wide class of heuristics plausibly consistent with how ÿrms behave. Still, one could make other assumptions including the assumption of equilibrium. Until we have a clear idea of how ÿrms make decisions in complex situations, the only safe recourse is to consider various approaches. On that note, we hope our analysis will inspire others to re-examine our setting under alternative behavioral assumptions. The equation of motion on type 0 loyal customers is and on type 1 loyal customers is Hence, if exists then ¡ 1. Given an optimum must be interior and˜ is strictly concave then is deÿned by the ÿrst-order condition:
as g is strictly concave. Taking the total derivative of (B.2) with respect to w(0), one ÿnds
Proof of Theorem 2. There are two possible outcomes: (i) x 1 = x 2 so that one ÿrm's loyal customers are type 0 and the other ÿrm's are type 1; and (ii) x 1 = x 2 so that each ÿrm serves half of each consumer type. Let us ÿrst show that there does not exist an equilibrium with x 1 = x 2 . Wlog, suppose x 1 ¡ x 2 so that all type 0 consumers prefer to buy from ÿrm 1 and all type 1 consumers prefer to buy from ÿrm 2. It is immediate that (x 1 ; x 2 ) = ( ; ) and ÿrms' payo s are *
2 and consider ÿrm 1 locating at 1 − and earning a payo of
(B.6)
which is indeed true. Since * 1 is at least as great as the payo in (B.6), we conclude * 1 ¿ * 2 . Next suppose 6 1 2 . As is the unique optimal action when a ÿrm's loyal customer base is all of the type 0 consumers then * 1 exceeds the payo from locating at , holding ÿxed its loyal customer base to be all of the type 0 consumers:
Next note that the right-hand side of (B.7) exceeds * 2 :
which is true since ¿ We are now prepared to prove that ( ; ) is not a Nash equilibrium when X is su ciently dense. As ¿ 0, ÿrm 2 has the option of locating at − Á, which is the location just below , and having all of the type 0 consumers as its loyal customer base. Since Á 6 (X ), as (X ) → 0 then the proÿt to ÿrm 2 from locating at − Á converges to * 1 . Since * 1 ¿ * 2 -and these proÿt levels are independent of (X ) since and are independent of (X ) -then ÿrm 2 prefers to locate at − Á than at when (X ) is su ciently small. Therefore, we conclude that when X is su ciently dense, there does not exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. Now consider (
. Suppose x ∈ X − {0; 1}. A necessary condition for equilibrium is that locating at x is preferable to locating at the next lowest value, denoted x − Á, and having a loyal customer base of all of the type 0 consumers:
For this to hold ∀ (X ) ¿ 0, it must hold ∀Á ¿ 0 which requires that
Another necessary condition is that locating at x is preferable to locating at the next highest value, denoted x + Á, and having a loyal customer base of all of the type 1 consumers:
For this to hold ∀ (X ) ¿ 0, it must be true that
Combining these two conditions yields g(x) = (1 − )g(1 − x). At a value of x that satisÿes that equality, a ÿrm is indi erent between locating at x and locating arbitrarily below x (and focusing on type 0 consumers) and arbitrarily above x (and focusing on type 1 consumers). If ¡ x then locating at is strictly preferred to locating at x − Á as Á → 0. In that case, locating at is strictly preferred to locating at x. It is then necessary that x 6 . By the same logic, it is necessary that 6 x. As this implies x 6 ¡ 6 x, it is concluded that @x ∈ X − {0; 1} such that (x; x) is an equilibrium. Consider x = 1. Each ÿrm's payo is ( =2)g(1) + [(1 − )=2]g(0) and this is strictly less than locating at 0 and earning (1 − ) g(0) + (1 − )g(1). So (1,1) is not an equilibrium.
Finally, consider x = 0. The necessary and su cient condition for equilibrium is that a ÿrm prefers to locate at 0, and share both consumer types, than to locate at and serve only type 1 consumers. This holds i ( ) ¿ 0 where Proof of Theorem 3. Consider (x 1 ; x 2 ; ÿ; ) as a candidate absorbing state and suppose x 1 ¡ x 2 . Given this ordering, some consumers will switch loyalties unless all type 0 consumers are loyal to ÿrm 1 and all type 1 consumers are loyal to ÿrm 2. Thus, if (x 1 ; x 2 ; ÿ; ) is an absorbing state and x 1 ¡ x 2 then (ÿ; ) = ( ; 0). Given (ÿ; ) = ( ; 0), ÿrms will not switch to any other location if (x 1 ; x 2 )=( ; ) as then each ÿrm's location is optimal given its customer base. Furthermore, if x 1 = then ÿrm 1 will change its location with positive probability; speciÿcally, it will change to if it receives such ÿrm i's virtual proÿt and that it lies in the interior [min{ 1 . To handle this case, two properties are required. First, if x 1 ¡ 1 (ÿ; ) then 1 (x 1 ; ÿ; ) is non-increasing in x 1 . Recall that 1 (x ; ÿ; ) is implicitly deÿned bỹ 1 (x ; ÿ; ) =˜ 1 ( 1 (x ; ÿ; ); ÿ; ); (B.13)
when such a solution exists in [0,1] and otherwise is a corner solution. In the latter case, 1 (x 1 ; ÿ; ) is ÿxed with respect to x 1 . When 1 (x ; ÿ; ) ∈ (0; 1), totally di erentiating (B.13) and solving for 9 1 (x ; ÿ; )=9x 1 yields 9 1 (x ; ÿ; ) 9x 1 = 9˜ 1 (x ; ÿ; )=9x 1 9˜ 1 ( 1 (x ; ÿ; ); ÿ; )=9x 1 ;
which is negative by (B.13) and that˜ 1 (x; ÿ; ) is concave with respect to x 1 . The second needed property is if ÿ ¿ ÿ and 6 then 1 (x 1 ; ÿ ; ) 6 1 (x 1 ; ÿ ; ). Recall that virtual proÿt takes the form 1 (x 1 ; ÿ; ) = Â 0 (ÿ; )g(x) + Â 1 (ÿ; )g(1 − x);
where we have replaced (w(0); w(1)) with (ÿ; ). Using this expression in (B.13) and totally di erentiating with respect to ÿ yields, after solving for 9 1 (x ; ÿ ; )=9ÿ, 9 1 (x ; ÿ ; )=9ÿ = (9Â 0 =9ÿ)[g(x ) − g( 1 (x ; ÿ ; ))] − (9Â 1 =9ÿ)[g(1 − x ) − g(1 − 1 (x ; ÿ ; ))] Â 0 (ÿ; )g ( 1 (x ; ÿ ; )) − Â 1 (ÿ; )g (1 − 1 (x ; ÿ ; )) (B.14)
If x ¡ 1 (x ; ÿ ; ) then the denominator is negative as it is 9˜ 1 ( 1 (x ; ÿ; ); ÿ; )=9x 1 . Since x ¡ 1 (x ; ÿ ; ) also implies g(x ) ¿ g( 1 (x ; ÿ ; )) and g(1 − x ) ¡ g(1 − 1 (x ; ÿ ; )), it then follows from 9Â 0 =9ÿ ¿ 0 and 9Â 1 =9ÿ 6 0 (by A.5) that the numerator is positive. Hence, (B.14) is negative when x ¡ 1 (x ; ÿ ; ). An analogous proof applies when x ¿ 1 (x ; ÿ ; ). We conclude that 1 (x 1 ; ÿ; ) is non-increasing in ÿ.
22 An analogous proof shows that 1 (x 1 ; ÿ; ) is non-decreasing in . Therefore, if ÿ ¿ ÿ and 6 then 1 (x 1 ; ÿ ; ) 6 1 (x 1 ; ÿ ; ). With these two properties, we can show that if ensuring periods since the distance between (ÿ t ; t ) and ( ; 0) is shrinking. Similarly, if ÿrm 2 generates idea , it will adopt it and maintain that location in all ensuring periods. Note that T is bounded and this bound can be set independent of (ÿ 0 ; 0 ). Since there is a positive probability in each period of ÿrm 1 generating idea and ÿrm 2 generating idea then, with probability one, lim t→∞ (x t 1 ; x t 2 ) = ( ; ). This completes the proof.
